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There is a broad area of research to ensure that information is transmitted securely. Within this scope,
chaos-based cryptography takes a prominent role due to its nonlinear properties. Using these properties,
we propose a secure mechanism for transmitting data that relies on chaotic networks. We use a nonlinear
on–off device to cipher the message, and the transfer entropy to retrieve it. We analyze the system
capability for sending messages, and we obtain expressions for the operating time. We demonstrate the
system eﬃciency for a wide range of parameters. We ﬁnd similarities between our method and the
reservoir computing.
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A communication system is a device whose purpose is to con-
vey a message between spatially distinct locations. Schematically,
there are ﬁve elements in any communication system, namely: an
emitter, an encoder, a transmission channel, a decoder, and a re-
ceiver [1]. The encoder handles the message, so it passes through
the channel, and the decoder carries out the reverse process. In or-
der to be practical and safe, the construction of a communication
system may require other components [2].
A major concern of communication is the security in data trans-
mission. In many cases, the speed and reliability for transmitting
a message with low probability of errors is not enough, but also
the transmission has to be carried out in an extremely secure way.
In 1949, C.E. Shannon took a decisive step toward showing that
if the length of the key is not an inconvenience, a message can
be securely sent [1]. In a communication system, traditional cryp-
tography functions in the software level rather than in the high
speed physical level. Besides, security requires the use of ergodic
and mixing transformations also in the software level. In the early
1990s an attempt was made to show how to use chaos synchro-
nization to create a secure communications systems [3,4]. This
kind of synchronization has enabled one to create a fast crypto-
graphic system that operates in the physical (hardware) level of
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physleta.2013.01.021the communication system. Besides, chaotic systems are naturally
ergodic and mixing, which provides security. This initial idea was
shown to be insecure [5]; however, the complexity of nonlinear
systems enables other approaches. On account of this, different
communication systems based on chaos synchronization have been
proposed and investigated [6,7]. In general, such systems assume
chaotic dynamics for both the decoder and receiver. Thus, the en-
coder codiﬁes a message using some property of the chaotic signal
and, after being transmitted, the message is decoded by the re-
ceiver, which is synchronized to the emitter [8].
An eavesdropper trying to determine the parameters of a cryp-
tographic system will always make an error. If the dynamics of the
system is chaotic, a small error grows exponentially what makes
diﬃcult to decrypt the intercepted message [9–14], if the decoding
relies on a receiver that is exactly identical to an emitter. This is
one of the properties that made chaos-based cryptosystems popu-
lar.
Synchronization offers a communication system where informa-
tion is transmitted and received in real time and that operates
in physical level. However, the need for synchronization reduces
the parameter range of the transmitter and receiver within which
the system can be considered secure. For example, in [15] it was
shown that receiver and emitter do not need to match for the re-
trieval of information.
A different approach to secure communication using cou-
pled chaotic systems was presented by Hung and Hu [16]. In
their method, a binary message is codiﬁed considering the cou-
pling direction between chaotic maps on a ring. The receiver de-
codes the message, determining the transfer entropy [17] between
R.M. Szmoski et al. / Physics Letters A 377 (2013) 760–765 761succeeding maps. Indeed, for any interacting system, the trans-
fer entropy can be used for determining which variables inﬂuence
the dynamics of each other. The novel feature of this method is
that it does not require synchronization for transmitting data; it
only requires the determination of the transfer entropy. One in-
convenience is that, as this quantity is statistically deﬁned, many
observations from the dynamics of the maps are necessary in or-
der to decode the message. The observation interval needed by the
receiver to determine the transfer entropy between the maps was
taken as the relaxation time [16]. Therefore, the transmission of
information through this mechanism requires operating times that
are multiples of the relaxation time.
In this work, we propose an improvement over the previous
method of Hung and Hu consisting of a communication system
that uses both chaos synchronization as well as transfer entropy.
While Hung and Hu’s method uses only one network of cou-
pled maps, our model contains two networks, the emitter and
the receiver, the latter being a replica of the former. The trans-
mission of a message through the system is accomplished by two
stages that we call pre- and post-synchronization. Here, synchro-
nization occurs just between the elements with the same label, in
the emitting and receiving networks. Importantly, the elements in
each network are out of synchronization. The use of desynchro-
nized networks allows one to explore the good properties of syn-
chronization, namely fast transmission of information, but without
losing the parameter range for which the system is secure [18].
Mostly important, since that all nodes in the emitter network are
desynchronous, the encoded signal generated by this network is
composed by variables that are not correlated. In our method, it
is strictly necessary that receiver is identical to emitter in order to
decode the message. Since the transmitter is composed by a large
network of desynchronous elements, it is very diﬃcult to deter-
mine the parameters of this network by analyzing the transmit-
ted signal. An eavesdropper cannot reproduce equally the emitter.
Even if an intruder manages to ﬁnd all values of the state vari-
ables from the emitter and receiver, if one does not know precisely
the coupling function and intensity, one is not capable of decod-
ing the message correctly. Assuming the coupling prescription to
be secret keys of the communication system, if the key is altered
after each communication, then security would be increased fur-
ther.
In the stage of pre-synchronization, the networks start inter-
acting directly with each other until every node of the emitting
network becomes identical to other every node with the same
label of the receiving network. Once the emitter and receiver net-
works are synchronized, the second stage starts transmitting and
decoding the message. During this stage, the interaction between
networks is deactivated and the message is encoded in a binary
signal through an on–off device. The advantage of this procedure
consists on transmitting N bits of information for each unit of the
relaxation time. In other words, the communication device trans-
mits N bits of information using a bit stream, which makes data
transmission fast.
The proposed method relies on the fact that a long scalar quan-
tity, composed by the trajectory of a uni-dimensional system (s)
coupled in a master–slave fashion with an N-dimensional emitter
network by a connecting matrix representing the binary message
to be transmitted, carries information about these couplings and,
therefore, the message. The message can only be decoded by a per-
son that has complete knowledge of the emitter network. Imagine
the system s as a node in a large dynamical network. With the ex-
ception of the node s, assume that the information about all other
nodes is either known or can be precisely measured. Our method
works because it is possible to determine, which are the nodes in
this dynamical network that are connected to s by measuring the
ﬂow of information created by a connection. Hence, nodes coupledto s inﬂuence its dynamical behavior. Furthermore, the receiver
uses the transfer entropy to decode the message.
The fundamentals behind the success of our cryptographic
method share similarities with one possible way in which the in-
formation is believed to be processed and transmitted in the brain.
Reservoir Computing (RC) [19] is a machine-learning paradigm em-
ployed to retrieve from a dynamical network, the reservoir (the
“brain”), information of an external perturbation driving it, input.
The assumption behind RC is that the information about the in-
put is spread out all over the network, and reliable retrieval of
it can be accomplished by making a weighted average from the
trajectories of some selected nodes of the reservoir, the output.
Discovering which nodes should be selected is a remarkable task
that can be resolved by a learning process whose purpose is to ﬁnd
an approximate match between input and output. In summary, one
hopes to ﬁnd the connecting topology between the reservoir and
output (for a given random connecting topology between the in-
put and the reservoir), such that the output matches the input. It
has been recently demonstrated that RC can be performed by a
reservoir composed by a single dynamical node operating as if it
were a complex system [20]. In order to make the analogy between
RC and the proposed cryptographic method, imagine the system
s functioning as the reservoir, the emitter network being respon-
sible to produce the input, the connecting topology between the
input and s is given by the message, and the output is generated
by the receiver network, which in our method equals the input
in the post-synchronization stage. Similarly, to RC, which considers
that the input perturbs any random set of nodes in the reservoir,
the proposed cryptographic method works regardless of how is the
connecting topology between the input and s, the message. Any
random message can be decoded by whom has conﬁdential infor-
mation. The main assumption for the success of RC lies behind
the belief that the reservoir stores information about the pertur-
bation experienced by it. According to this analogy, we argue that
the state of the reservoir stores speciﬁc information about the way
how it is disturbed. In contrast to RC, that aims at discovering the
connecting topology between the reservoir and output, in the pro-
posed cryptographic method it is the connecting topology between
input and the reservoir, the message that needs to be revealed. Fi-
nally, in RC input and output only roughly match, whilst in our
method, they need to match perfectly; otherwise, the message can-
not be decoded. Therefore, this analogy allows one to interpret the
encoding system s as a sort of reservoir that has memory about
the message, i.e., the way it is being perturbed.
This work is organized as follows: in Section 2, we describe
the communication device based on both chaos synchroniza-
tion and transfer entropy analysis. Section 3 describes the pre-
synchronization stage, computing the synchronization time of a
lattice of coupled piecewise-linear chaotic maps. In Section 4 we
describe the post-synchronization stage, determining the relax-
ation time of the system. Section 5 examines an example of data
transmission through this mechanism. The last section is devoted
to our conclusions.
2. Description of the communication mechanism
Consider the emitter (E) and receiver (R) networks as two
identical coupled map lattices composed by N sites each one [21–
23]. The number of sites N is deﬁned according to the amount
of bits in a message that will be transmitted. If we assume the
message as a binary sequence m = {m(1)m(2), . . . ,m(N ′)} of length
N ′ , with m(i) equal to 0 or 1, N is equal to the number of el-
ements belonging to this sequence, this is N = N ′ . The state of
the E and R networks, at each discrete time n, is deﬁned by the
vectors en = (e(1)n , e(2)n , . . . , e(N)n )T and rn = (r(1)n , r(2)n , . . . , r(N)n )T , re-
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n corresponding to a state variable z ∈ Ω
whose time evolution is governed by a chaotic map f : Ω → Ω ,
with Ω ⊂R.
There have been investigations of chaos synchronization be-
tween replicas of coupled map networks using continuous maps
[24–26]. Based on such previous investigations we can restrict our
analysis to continuous maps f over the set Ω . In particular, we
focus on the piecewise-linear tent map f (z) = 1− 2|z − 0.5| [27].
Besides the individual dynamics, the sites in each network are
submitted to a coupling prescription. This intra-network coupling
is arbitrary, but, for transmitting and sending a message correctly
both E and R networks must be taken as identical, sharing the
same coupling prescription and parameters. So, our communi-
cation system uses a symmetric private key. Here we consider
a Laplacian-local intra-network coupling with periodic boundary
conditions and random initial conditions:
F
(
z(i)
)= (1− ε) f (z(i)n )+ ε2
[
f
(
z(i−1)n
)+ f (z(i+1)n )], (1)
where z(i) = z(N±i) represents the state variable of the i-th site (i =
1, . . . ,N) and ε ∈ [0,1] stands for the strength of intra-network
coupling in each network.
The transmission data process between E and R networks is
composed by two stages: the pre- and post-synchronization. When
we refer to synchronization we mean the process in which en = rn
for all n. The components of each state vector are necessarily not
equal. If all maps of a network mutually synchronize, then the dy-
namics of the network, given by Eq. (1), reduces to the dynamics
of an uncoupled map. This is an undesirable feature for the point
of view of the secure communication, since an intruder could de-
termine the network state from knowing the state of only one
site, that would endanger the security of the transmission. Thus,
in order to avoid mutual synchronization in each network, we will
assume that intra-network coupling intensity is suﬃciently weak,
which increases the dimension of the emitter.
3. Pre-synchronization stage
A way of synchronizing the state vectors of the E and R
networks is to assume an interaction between them. This inter-
network coupling may be unidirectional or bidirectional. In the
ﬁrst case, also known as master–slave coupling, one network in-
ﬂuences the dynamics of the other but is not inﬂuenced by the
latter; while, in the second case, both networks inﬂuence and are
inﬂuenced by each other. We will take here the master–slave cou-
pling, E as the master and R as the slave networks, such that the
dynamics of the system is described by
e(i)n+1 = F
(
e(i)n
)
,
r(i)n+1 = (1− γ )F
(
r(i)n
)+ γ F (e(i)n ), (2)
in which γ is the strength of the inter-network coupling. Fig. 1
illustrates the system described by Eqs. (1) and (2). Each site is
represented by a disc and the lines indicate the connections among
them. Note that the E-sites interact with their neighbors inside
the E-network, and R-sites interact with their neighbors inside the
R-network (intra-network connections are bidirectional). However,
the sites of E inﬂuence a corresponding site of R and its nearest
neighbors, since the inter-network connections are unidirectional.
The coupling remains active while the networks do not syn-
chronize with each other. When this occurs the network E stops
sending information about its state variables. Since the synchro-
nization of the E and R networks marks the end of the ﬁrst stage
of the process, we have to identify when it occurs. We use as
a synchronization diagnostic, the synchronization error average,
given byFig. 1. Schematic diagram of the connections between corresponding sites (la-
beled 2) of two networks (E: emitter; R: receiver) with Laplacian-local intra-
network coupling and a master–slave inter-network coupling. (a) Site 2 in both
networks have outcoming intra-network coupling. Outcoming inter-network cou-
pling is described by site 2 of E coupled to sites 1, 2, and 3 of R; (b) Site 2 in
both networks have incoming intra-network coupling. Incoming inter-network cou-
pling is described by site 2 of R coupled to sites 1, 2, and 3 of E.
Fig. 2. Average synchronization time as a function of the intra-network coupling
parameter ε for different values of the inter-network coupling parameter γ . The
solid line is a least squares ﬁt with slope −1.0.
wn = 1
N
N∑
i=1
∣∣e(i)n − r(i)n ∣∣. (3)
If the state vectors of E and R networks are synchronous we have
wn = 0, otherwise wn > 0. The synchronization time τs is the time
it takes for this average error to be less than 10−14 over a time
window of 1000 consecutive iterations of the system.
In order to make the en and rn vectors identical we need to
choose the γ and ε parameters in such a way that they allow syn-
chronization. In the particular case in which ε = 0, synchronization
is just observed when γ > γc = 1/2. For an inter-network coupling
strength of γ = 1/2 ± δ, we investigated the synchronization time
τs between the networks as a function of the intra-network cou-
pling strength ε. Fig. 2 shows the average synchronization time as
a function of the intra-network coupling strength for 100 different
randomly chosen initial conditions, N = 21 and for different val-
ues of δ. We see that, for γ = 0.5 (δ = 0) and ε < 0.3, the average
synchronization time scales with ε as a power-law
〈τs〉 = Cε−α, (4)
in which C and α are obtained by the best ﬁt of the points. In
the case presented we have the following values: α = 1.018 and
C = 32.23. Considering networks of different sizes, we found that
α ≈ 1.0 while C depends on the value of w from which the net-
works are considered synchronized, more speciﬁcally, C = lnw−1.
Even though this relation, in general, is not a power-law for any
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XOR true table.
Message 0 0 1 1
Keystream 0 1 0 1
XOR 0 1 1 0
Table 2
Cipher and decipher operations.
Plain Text ⊕ Keystream = ciphertext
ciphertext ⊕ keystream = Plain text
value of ε, it can be used nevertheless to estimate the synchroniza-
tion time between the networks. In the following we will consider
just the case for ε  0.1 and, thus, Eq. (4) allows us to estimate the
time it takes for the coupled networks to mutually synchronize.
4. Post-synchronization stage
In the previous section, we showed how to synchronize the
networks E and R by controlling the inter-network coupling pa-
rameter γ . Here, we will describe how to convey a particular
message m between E and R in a safe and eﬃcient way. A neces-
sary condition is that both networks remain synchronized during
all the process, otherwise the receiver will not be able to read the
message correctly.
Remember that we consider the networks to be synchronized
whenever the synchronization error wn is less than a tolerance
ﬁxed at 10−14. In order to keep the network synchronized we
truncate the state variables of both E and R such that we get rid
of differences o(w) less than 10−14. Then we turn off the inter-
network coupling, since it is no longer necessary for keeping the
networks synchronized. Indeed, E and R being identical networks,
if en = rn at a given instant n = τs then they remain synchronized
for all n > τs .
After the inter-network coupling is switched off the second
stage of the communication process begins, in which we trans-
mit the desired message. To compare our method with traditional
cryptography, we brieﬂy introduce the famous Vernam cipher [28],
a symmetrical key cipher where plain text digits are combined
with a keystream. This combination produces a ciphertext using
the operation XOR, symbolized by ⊕, whose true table is pre-
sented in Table 1. The operation is reciprocal: one uses an identical
keystream both to encipher plain text to ciphertext and to decipher
ciphertext to yield the original plain text (Table 2).
According to Shannon, for a cipher to be considered secure it
must satisfy the following conditions: (i) the keystream must have
at least the same length of the message, (ii) is changed at ev-
ery communication, and (iii) binary symbols of keystream must be
randomly decorrelated, then cipher is proven to be secure [2].
In our method, the XOR transformation is a sophisticated non-
linear transformation. Similarly to the Vernam cipher, the size of
the emitter network is equal to the length of the message. The
emitter network has a role similar to the keystream in the Ver-
nam cipher method. Finally, the requirement that a keystream
must have decorrelated symbols is analogously reproduced in our
method by having decorrelated nodes in the emitter network.
We introduce a discrete-time dynamical system S : Ω → Ω that
is responsible for encoding the message in the signal consisting
of an orbit of the system S . The map S deﬁnes the value of the
signal sn in each time instant associating the message characters
to the state variables of the emitter network through an on–off
device. If the i-th element of the message m, denoted as m(i) , has
a binary value of 1, then e(i)n inﬂuences the dynamics of sn (mode-
on), whereas if m(i) = 0, then e(i)n does not inﬂuence the signaldynamics (mode-off). Moreover, the dynamics of the signal is given
by the following map
sn+1 = S(sn) = (1− β)sn + β
η
N∑
i=1
e(i)n m
(i), (5)
in which β ≡ (N − 1)/N and η =∑Ni=1m(i) is a normalization fac-
tor. Given a randomly chosen initial condition s0 the iteration of
the map S yields a chaotic orbit {sn}n=0. The map S itself is not
chaotic but, since it is driven by e(i)n , that it is itself chaotic, the
orbit {sn}n=0 results chaotic as well.
Notice that the magnitude of the signal is not a feature of the
message, it is rather a feature of the dynamics of each element of
the emitter network (E). Consequently, if the system initiates from
different initial states, the same message will generally result in
different signals. On the other hand, it may happen that two dif-
ferent messages result in the same signal for a limited and usually
short period of time, however the signals will eventually diverge
with time.
For recovering the message contained in the signal {sn}n=0 the
receiver network R ﬁrst veriﬁes which state variables e(i)n = r(i)n in-
ﬂuence and which do not inﬂuence the sn+1. Then the receiver
network associates the symbol 1 to the former case and 0 to the
latter case, observing the indexes of the sites in the network. The
transfer entropy is the dynamical tool that allows the receiver
network R to accomplish such veriﬁcation. The transfer entropy
T
r(i)n →sn+1 vanishes if and only if the dynamics of sn+1 does not de-
pend on the dynamics of r(i)n , so if the transfer entropy is nonzero
there is a statistical coherence between these signals. It is deﬁned
as
T
r(i)n →sn+1 =
∑
p
(
sn+1, sn, r(i)n
)
log
p(sn+1|sn, r(i)n )
p(sn+1|sn) , (6)
where p( , , ) and p( | ) mean the join and conditional probabili-
ties, respectively. These probabilities may be calculated using a box
counting algorithm or a kernel estimator [17]. In this work we use
the former procedure by considering the following coarse-grained
variables
x˜ =
{
0, if 0< x 1/2,
1, if 1/2< x< 1,
(7)
in such a way that, instead of using the variables r(i)n , sn and sn+1
we use the binary variables r˜(i)n , s˜n and s˜n+1.
Since there are only eight possible binary states, the summation
in Eq. (6) has only eight terms. Besides, instead of working with
the signal sn itself, it suﬃces to consider the binary variables s˜n
without risk of turning the decoding process unsafe. In the binary
form the signal can be transmitted through any public channel. In
the following we explain how the determination of the transfer
entropy of each variable from the receiver network to the signal
enables the receiver to decode the message.
When the receiver network computes the transfer entropy to
recover the message encoded in the signal, it hardly will achieve
a vanishing contribution due to the ﬂuctuations. Moreover the re-
ceiver network sites coupled with the signal yield a transfer en-
tropy value much higher than those uncoupled sites. A high-pass
ﬁlter is used to enable the receiver network to correctly recover
the message. Let m be the message sent by the emitter network
and m′ be the message recovered by the receiver network. The el-
ements of the received message are given by:
m′ (i) = Θ(T
r(i)n →sn+1 − σ(T )
)
, (8)
where Θ(x) is the Heaviside unit step function and σ(T ) is the
transfer entropy standard deviation of all network sites of the R
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strength ε, (b) message size N , (c) Nε, for Nm = 100 different messages, each of
them with N0 = 100 initial conditions. (d) The upper limit for the relaxation time.
The red line stands for Eq. (9). (For interpretation of the references to color in this
ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this Letter.)
network. Hence the received message is a string of 0’s and 1’s if
the transfer entropy of the corresponding network site is less or
greater than one standard deviation of T .
The decoding process performed by the receiver network is not
instantaneous, but requires a ﬁnite time interval during which a
suﬃciently large amount of binary signal is sent, in order to cor-
rectly decode the message. We deﬁne the relaxation time τR the
time it takes for R to correctly decode the message, i.e. such that
m′ = m [16]. We have observed that the value of τR depends on
the message, for a given set of parameters. Hence we work with
the average relaxation time 〈τR〉, where the average is taken with
respect to a number Nm of randomly chosen messages.
In numerical simulations, we consider a number Nm = 100 of
different messages m consisting of randomly chosen strings of bits.
The whole set of average relaxation times is plotted as a function
of the intra-network coupling strength ε [Fig. 3(a)] and the net-
work size N [Fig. 3(b)], where we veriﬁed that 〈τR〉 grows with
both parameters. So, it is suggestive to analyze the τR -dependency
with respect to the product Nε [Fig. 3(c)], which shows a growth
whose upper bound is an exponential curve
〈τR〉 = KeκNε, (9)
where K = 4.9 × 103 and κ = 1/3 were obtained by ﬁtting the
maximum relaxation time points, presented in Fig. 3(d).
During the transmission of the message it may well happen
that some amount of noise corrupts the transmitted signal. It is
thus important to verify if the receiver network remains able to
decode correctly the message in the presence of external noise,
within a time of the order of relaxation time. We consider that
the signal sn is subjected to a Gaussian noise of zero mean and
variance σ . The bit error ratio (BER) is the fraction of erroneously
transmitted bits with respect to the total number of bits in the
message [29]. This ratio was computed as an average over Nm =
500 randomly chosen messages of ﬁxed length N = 51. In Fig. 4
we plot the bit error ratio (BER) as a function of σ and the intra-
network coupling strength ε. Note that, for σ < 0.1 BER nearly
vanishes for all values of ε and, thus, there is no difference be-
tween the decoded and emitted messages for a time n = 〈τR〉. EvenFig. 4. Colors represent the bit error ratio as a function of the intra-network cou-
pling strength and the noise level. The values represent an average over 500 ran-
domly chosen messages of length 51 bits. (For interpretation of the references to
color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this Letter.)
Fig. 5. (a) 21-bit message sent; (b) Transfer entropy between r˜(i)n and s˜n ; (c) Message
received.
for a stronger noise level the BER was found to be small, showing
that the communication process is robust in presence of noise.
5. Application to a speciﬁc example
We now exemplify the use of the communication system de-
scribed in the previous sections to transmit a speciﬁc binary mes-
sage. Let us suppose that the message contains N = 21 bits and is
given by the binary string m = 10111001011111110011 [Fig. 5(a)].
Hence both the emitter and receiver networks should have N = 21
sites. Besides having the same number of sites the networks should
share a symmetric security key that is represented by the intra-
network coupling strength ε, and the inter-network, from which
we calculated the time to synchronize. The value of the inter-
network coupling strength has been ﬁxed as γ = 1/2. Assuming a
value ε = 0.1, Eqs. (4) and (9) result in 〈τs〉 = 323 and 〈τR〉 ≈ 104,
respectively, for the average synchronization and relaxation times.
Since these are average values, we can consider here τs = 103 and
τR = 2× 104.
We couple the E and R networks following Eq. (2) and during
n = τS iterates in the ﬁrst stage of the process. At this point we
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truncate the state variables such that en = rn and switch off the
inter-network coupling. In the beginning of the second state we
use Eq. (5) to obtain a signal sn which is transformed by Eq. (7) in
a binary sequence s˜n .
The receiver network keeps this binary signal during subse-
quent n = τR iterates and, through Eq. (6), computes the transfer
entropy for all network sites [Fig. 5(b)]. Finally, using Eq. (8) as
a high-pass ﬁlter, the receiver network decodes the message sent
[Fig. 5(c)], which is clearly identical to the sent message. We re-
mark that this process is extremely safe, since even if an eaves-
dropper would be able to snatch the signal that has been sent, the
probability of this eavesdropper to strike all the variables r˜(i)n dur-
ing the time τR would be P = 2−NτR = 2−63000. This is also the
probability of striking the message sent, which is utterly insigniﬁ-
cant.
6. Conclusions
We proposed in this work a robust and safe device for trans-
mitting binary messages using replicas of coupled map networks.
The communication system uses transfer entropy and as a conse-
quence allows the construction of a communication system where
information can only be decoded if the emitter and receiver are
completely synchronous and they are exactly identical. Since nodes
in each network are not synchronous, that enables the generation
of a decorrelated encoded signal. This provides an extra security
for the communication system, since it makes virtually impossible
for an eavesdropper to discover the dynamics of the emitter.
In addition, imagine that the eavesdropper is very clever and it
knows exactly the time the emitter and the receiver network take
to synchronize. If it does not know exactly the connecting topology
of the receiver network, it will not maintain synchronization. The
eavesdropper will also not be able to verify the existence of syn-
chronization, since all nodes in its network will be desynchronous.
Suppose now that the eavesdropper knows all the secret keys (in-
tra and inter couplings and connecting topology). Still all that is
needed for the communication system to regain security is that
the emitter and the receiver changes at a given time their network
connecting topology, after the message has started being transmit-
ted. This will maintain synchronization between E and R, but will
make the network of the eavesdropper to become desynchronous.
Both networks must have the same size N as the message itself (in
number of bits).
The proposed system works in two stages: in the ﬁrst one we
synchronize the emitter and receiver networks. Only emitter and
receiver know how much time it takes to achieve synchronization.
After the ﬁrst stage the inter-network coupling is switched off, but
the networks remain synchronized.
In the second stage we encode a given message into a signal
which is read by the receiver network using the transfer entropy
between the receiver network and the signal, with a high-pass ﬁl-
ter based on the standard deviation of the transfer entropy. The
message can be decoded after a relaxation time. We obtained an
expression for an upper bound of the relaxation time as a func-
tion of the intra-network coupling strength and the message size.
Hence, given a message of arbitrary size the intra-network cou-
pling strength can be chosen in order to minimize the transmission
time.
The proposed device is similar to a method developed by Hung
and Hu [16] but differs from it in this way: in our method we com-
pact N bits of the message into a bit-stream of the signal, whereasin the Hung and Hu method every bit of the message is encoded
in a different bit of the signal. Hence our method represents a con-
siderable increase in the channel capacity attainable.
We considered a speciﬁc example to test this method and, com-
paring the message read by the receiver with the message emitted,
we veriﬁed that the method is reliable. Besides this advantage, the
method we propose is robust since, even in presence of external
noise, the bit error ratio can be kept in suﬃciently low levels, vary-
ing the intra-network coupling and noise level.
Finally, we shown that even if an eavesdropper could intercept
the signal, it could not strike the message (more precisely, the
probability of it is negligible). We suggest that other continuous
maps as well as other intra- and inter-network couplings may also
be used. Some tests with other intra-network couplings have sug-
gested us that, for instance, the synchronization time power-law
behavior remains unaltered. This was also veriﬁed when consider-
ing the logistic map for the dynamics of each network site.
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